Twenty Vital Defence Planning and Related Questions the NATO Warsaw Summit Should Address... but will probably not.

A Food-for-Thought Paper
By
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The bottom-line for the Warsaw Summit is this; effective NATO deterrence will only be established if NATO’s forward presence is in strength, reinforced by a properly enhanced NATO Response Force, which in turn is allied to a credible ability of Alliance forces to overcome Russia’s growing and impressive anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capability. And, that NATO forces are able to deploy in sufficient force and time to match Russian deployments. At present that is not the case. Indeed, it is still far from being the case.

This paper poses twenty questions the Warsaw Summit should address... but will probably not:

1. Is NATO fit for twenty-first century purpose?
2. Who has real power?
3. What if war breaks out in Europe?
4. Just how dangerous is Russia?
5. Can NATO defend itself?
6. Is Europe serious about defence?
7. Is the NATO defence and deterrence posture credible?
8. Do political NATO and military NATO agree about war?
9. Can Central Europeans influence Europe’s defence?
10. Is the balance of power in NATO Europe shifting?
11. What is the EU planning?
12. What are the strategic implications of Brexit?
13. Can Germany lead European defence?
14. Would a European Defence Union work?
15. Are NATO and the EU compatible?
16. Has NATO the strategic imagination to fight a new war?
17. Do NATO Europe’s leaders have the political courage to think about war?
18. What price will the Americans demand?
19. What critical defence planning issues must Warsaw address?
20. Is NATO the enduring Alliance?
Ladies and Gentlemen,

On July 8th and 9th 2016, the Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will take place in Warsaw. This meeting of Alliance heads of state and government – partners for security within the Alliance – is taking place at a key moment for NATO, due to changes in the international arena, and on NATO’s eastern, north-eastern and southern flanks. As the fundamental political and military organisation of free democratic states, the Alliance is confronted today with essential threats to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, and in particular NATO member states. A predominant aim of the Summit shall be to define the direction of action needed to adjust NATO to new security-related challenges, in particular the protection of its members from universal threats emerging in many directions.

Since the NATO 2014 Summit in Newport in Wales (United Kingdom), and the June 2015 meeting of defence ministers, the level of defence readiness of NATO has been increased as a result of the resolutions agreed at those meetings. However, this level does not as yet suffice if the Alliance is to guarantee the security of its members in the face of the Russian policy of New Imperialism. Russia is acting in an aggressive and destructive manner, as demonstrated almost weekly, as Moscow seeks to force-achieve its hegemonic goals by such actions as the illegal 2014 invasion of the independent state of Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, the occupation of parts of that country in the Donbass, as well as threatening the use of force, contrary to the elementary norms of international order. The Russian concept of foreign and security policy, built on the confrontational New Imperialism, represents a breach of the fundamental rules of international law, and brings into question today’s peaceful order in Europe. Moscow’s aggressive actions go against the very rules of the Final Act of the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the 1990 Paris Charter and fundamental issue of international peace and the inviolability of European borders, the provisions of the 1994 Vienna Document, as well as principles which uphold the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Moscow also terminated the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Despite the increase in the threat posed by Russia, NATO insists on a dual approach towards Russia that combines strength with dialogue, and which was used in the past by the Alliance as part of the then engagement with the former Eastern Bloc. This dual approach to some extent recalls the Harmel Report of 1967 (Report of the Council on the Future Task of the Alliance). On the one hand, NATO is seeking to increase the influence of its deterrent force in relation to Moscow. On the other hand, NATO is reaching out to Russia by offering crisis-easing solutions in the form of political dialogue. And yet, the parallel implementation of those two strategies must be based on a realistic assessment of the dangers Moscow poses, and the political and military force ratios NATO confront, not on wishful thinking or anticipating scenarios that may strategically never occur. The geopolitical situation at the eastern, north-eastern and southern flanks of NATO thus requires a proper defensive response from the Organisation. Otherwise, any retreat from NATO’s primary mission to ensure the joint, collective defence of its member states under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty would undermine the very existence of the Alliance.

CEE states, i.e. Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania have the absolute right to expect from NATO that their security is ensured and assured by hard guarantees of security and defence. Those guarantees should not only ensure a proper balance between the levels of security afforded to the less protected eastern and southern areas of NATO, but permanently establish permanent installations in this region, to enable NATO forces to be stationed permanently where needed, including the provision of proper quarters, the stationing of operational and command personnel, as well as the forward positioning of appropriate military equipment. Such an approach would ena-
able the Alliance to quickly adjust it structures and its force posture given the array of threats coming from the east. Decisions taken thus far have failed in this regard.

Critically, the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisa-
tion does not exclude the permanent stationing of NATO forces in Eastern Europe. When the Act was signed the geopolitical circumstances in Eu-
rope were significantly different. Today, the provi-
sions of 1997 are now wholly inadequate to meet the challenges of 2016. Specifically, NATO needs to increase its strategic depth, so that Alliance leaders and commanders can quickly relocate forces where needed. Such a force posture would entail, at the very least, the extension and enlarge-
ment of the so-called VJTF (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force), the adjustment and extension of Staff at the headquarters of the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin, as well as the further development of the enhanced NATO Response Force (eNRF). The active NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP) is based on the so-called Assurance Measures, i.e. re-assurance measures to underline the solidarity of the member states of the Alliance, and on Adaptation Measures, i.e. reforms of the Alliance adjusted to the level of threat.

In order to fulfil the new defence tasks, it has become necessary to increase the investments member states must make on armaments. There-
fore, NATO should focus on the active implement-
tion of the solidarity policy by implementing assurance measures in pursuit of the security of the Alliance’s eastern member states. The state of security in the region is of vital importance to Poland and the Baltic States, the provision of which also suggests not only the revival but the main-
taining of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as a dynamic, collective, twenty-first century de-

The effectiveness of NATO interventions and the Alliance’s readiness for prompt action is, and will remain, central to the operational readiness of na-
tional armed forces of NATO members. Whether or not NATO can establish lasting security guar-
antees for all of its members, particularly those on its eastern flank, shall depend to a great extent upon on the qualitative improvement of nation-
al armed forces with the aim of ensuring they are transformed into flexible, agile instruments deter-
rence against all and any potential aggressors.

In this, the 25th anniversary of its founding, the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation has the pleasure to introduce a unique publication by an outstanding expert on broad aspects of se-
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during Alliance 2016". The aim of the conference is simple; to lead an in-depth discussion on the challenge NATO faces not only during the Foun-
dation’s June conference, but also the July NATO Warsaw Summit.

Prof. Krzysztof Miszczak, PhD.
Head and Member of the Board of the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation
Warsaw, 28th June 2016

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gle, as well as the foreign and security policy of the People’s Republic of China.
Is NATO fit for Twenty-First Century Purpose?

Leading by example Poland announced in June 2016 an increase in its armed forces of some 50,000 personnel. The July 7-8 NATO Warsaw Summit takes place at a big, strategic moment in European defence with profound implications for NATO defence planning. NATO defines the defence planning process as follows: "The NDPP [NATO Defence Planning Process] is designed to influence national defence planning efforts and identifies and prioritises NATO's future capability requirements, apportions those requirements to each Ally as targets, facilitates their implementation and regularly assesses progress. It provides a framework for the harmonisation of national and Alliance defence planning activities aimed at the timely development and delivery of all the capabilities, military and non-military, needed to meet the agreed security and defence objectives inherent to the Strategic Concept".2

In theory at least the NATO Defence Planning Process links defence planning inputs at the national level, to desired strategic and security outcomes at the Alliance level. Re-establishing a credible linkage between planning and outcomes must be central to the NATO Warsaw Summit as the Alliance gets to grip with the new strategic realities of Europe in the twenty-first century, and indeed the wider world. In other words, Warsaw must address NATO's defence planning deficit.

This paper will address NATO’s defence planning challenges at the Warsaw Summit. The paper will also pose vital defence-planning and related questions, before concluding with recommendations for the Alliance and suggestions for the steps NATO must take in a rapidly changing Europe and world, and in the face of a new way of warfare, if NATO is indeed to remain the enduring alliance.

The core message of this paper is that Warsaw must form part of a grand strategic awakening of Alliance leaders. The September 2014 Wales Summit was an important first step on the road to strategic re-awakening, and a new idea of how the Alliance could match credibly ends, ways and means in an age in which strategy and austerity are mutually self-defeating. However, whether it be a President-elect Clinton or Trump that emerges from the November 2016 US general election, the growing global over-stretch from which the US is and will continue to suffer will doubtless lead the Americans to demand far more of a defence effort from their European allies. The Warsaw Summit must be seen in that political and strategic context and must pave the way towards the first NATO Summit of the new Administration. Indeed given that the Americans spend 73% of all Alliance defence spending (although do not devote all of that investment to the defence of Europe) and yet share a comparable GDP to the EU, it is likely the new Administration will demand a rapid increase in European defence expenditure and defence reform.3

1 See “Poland to Boost Army by 50,000 Men”, World Bulletin, 4 June, 2016 www.worldbulletin.net/world/173441/poland-to-boost-army-by-50000-men
2 * www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm?selectedLocale=en
3 See “Funding NATO”, www.nato.int/cps/en/nato/hq/topics/_67655.htm
Specifically, the Americans will likely demand an acceleration of the commitments made in the Defence Investment Pledge at the NATO Wales Summit that all Allies will either maintain or increase their respective defence budgets to 2% GDP "within a decade", and spend 20% of those budgets on equipment. Why 2%? It is simply that 2% GDP spent on defence is better than 1% GDP spent on defence, which is today nearer the NATO Europe average, especially when such moneys are spent badly, which is also far closer to the reality of most NATO Europeans today. Indeed, such an acceleration will be vital given the growing pressures from Russia and other threats, most notably ISIS, and given the growing pressures on Washington from American military over-stretch. At the very least, Europeans will need to undertake far more of the NATO burden if the Alliance is to realise the 360 degree adaptation it seeks and still retain a credible American security guarantee. Therefore, Warsaw’s defence planning challenge is both simple and critical; to face with credible military force an ever bigger strategic space, undertaking ever more tasks, at ever more cost, and with an ever more diverse and quite possibly smaller force.

The Warsaw Summit will also take place in the midst of a series of EU-related initiatives all of which have profound implications for NATO defence planning. On June 28th shortly after the June 23rd Brexit referendum EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini will announce the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy. The Global Strategy will call for deeper integration within the framework of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In July the German government will publish its defence Weissbuch, which may well call for the formation of a German-centric European Defence Union or EDU. Shortly thereafter nine EU member-states will join Germany under permanent structured co-operation (as agreed under the 2009 Lisbon Treaty) to move towards deeper defence integration. This step will mark the first real effort of the Eurozone countries to move beyond political and monetary union towards some form of putative defence union. Even the suggestion of such an initiative is already having a strategic impact on NATO.

Who has Real Power?
Power is a relative concept. Any assessment of the credibility of the NDPP in the face of contemporary challenges must first start with an assessment of relative contemporary economic and military power. According to the International Monetary Fund in 2015 the top five global economies were as follows: the US with an economy worth some $17.9 trillion (tr); China worth some $10.9tr; Japan some $4.1tr; Germany $3.3tr, and the UK $2.8tr. By way of contrast, the Russian economy was worth some $1.3tr in 2015, whilst the Polish economy some $0.47tr. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 2015 the top 5 global military spenders were the US at $597 billion (bn); China at $146bn; Saudi Arabia at $82bn; the UK at 56bn, and Russia at $52bn. This compares with France at $47bn, Germany at $37bn, and Poland at $10bn.

Critically, the World Bank suggests that the percentages of GDP spent on defence in 2015 by the major powers saw Russia spend some 4.6 %, which is placing the Russian economy under increasing strain, although President Putin shows no sign of abandoning his expansionist foreign and security policy; the US spent some 3.4% of GDP, France 2.2%, UK 2.0%, Germany 1.2%, whilst Poland in 2014 spent some 1.9% of its GDP on defence. The relative figures on defence investments programmes are also telling with the US investing some $700bn on new equipment, Russia $300bn, and the UK (interestingly) $250bn.
What if War Breaks Out in Europe?

If the Warsaw Summit achieves little else perhaps the most important contribution to the future proofing of the Alliance must be to return the NDPP to the principles of assuming and planning for the worst-case. It is 2019, the Russian economy is in a mess but the Putin regime shows no signs of changing policy direction. Insurrections rumble across the Middle East & North Africa as state after state begins to implode. Iran and Israel come close to war in what is left of Syria. Then the Unity Government in Libya collapses as ISIS begins to gain ground beyond its stronghold of Sirte.

Suddenly a crisis erupts in the South China Sea involving key US allies as Beijing threatens to exclude all other states from both the East and South China Seas, and also threatens action against what it regards as an anti-mainland president in Chinese Taipei. The US is forced to respond in force. However, the consequence of several years of US sequestration and Chinese military investment means that American action is only likely to prevail if Washington commits the bulk of its forces to Asia-Pacific. These include forces either stationed in Europe, or earmarked for the defence of Europe.

As American forces head south power and information networks begin to crash in the Baltic States, and across much of Central and Eastern Europe. Russian military exercises underway in and around the Kola Peninsula, Kaliningrad and Belarus, on the Ukrainian border, and the Black Sea, intensify and expand. Other forms of hybrid warfare are reported in the Baltic States. Then, what the Russian call non-linear warfare begins to turn into real warfare as the equivalent of four army corps or 120,000 troops in the Western Military Oblast begin to move towards NATO territory.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) meets in emergency session and reluctantly puts both the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) of some 5,000 troops, and the enhanced NATO Response Force (eNRF) of some 40,000 troops, on Notice to Move, and order the nine Graduated Response Force headquarters to standby, such as the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).

Realistically, the VJTF Notice to Move requires some 5 to 7 days, whilst for the eNRF it is 30 to 45 days. And, whilst on paper NATO has some 180 battalions to call on as part of its wider force structure many of them are ill-equipped, lack critical logistics, and are unable to move having been maintained at a lower level of readiness for several years and exercised only occasionally with other NATO forces. The most optimistic planning scenarios suggest that the bulk of NATO’s defence forces will take 60 to 180 days’ Notice to Move, and even longer between Notice to Move and Notice to Action. In any case many of the forces of the southern Allies have their eyes firmly fixed on the deteriorating situation to the south of the Mediterranean, as irregular migration flows suddenly accelerate, and the threat from ISIS grows.

As soon as the NAC meets the Kremlin begins to talk of NATO aggression and cites entirely fictional violations of Russian air, sea, land, and cyber space. Suddenly, Russian forces seize land either side of the Lithuanian and Polish borders between Kaliningrad and Belarus in the so-called Suwalki Gap, over some 65 kilometres of length. Moscow cites the failure of both Vilnius and Warsaw to agree guaranteed Russian land access to Kaliningrad. Russian forces also build up on the Estonian border claiming the need to protect the new corridor and gives all NATO forces five days to leave. The NAC again meets in emergency session and at Poland and Lithuania’s request issue an ultimatum; unless Russian forces are withdrawn from NATO territory in 48 hours the Alliance will declare a breach of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and invoke collective defence.

Russia immediately responds by putting its Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty-breaching 'Iskander M and Kalibr' short and medium-range nuclear weapons on full alert, thus threatening a nuclear attack on European cities. However, Moscow is careful not to place all of its Strategic Rocket Forces on alert as that would imply an impending threat against continental North America. At the same time in the wake of the NAC meeting, the Kremlin cites a vital Russian need to consolidate a ‘peace buffer’ between Russia and a “clearly aggressive NATO”.

Technically, the VJTF is the spearhead element of the eNRF. Therefore, the total force numbers some 40,000 troops.
Conventional deterrence has failed but neither the VJTF nor the eNRF are in place or any match for Russian forces in the area of operations (AOO). NATO’s conventional air power is in any case unable to overcome Russian anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities that were strengthened immeasurably by the 2015 stationing of the Voro-nezh radar system in Kaliningrad.

President Trump in characteristically blunt language says to Europe; “We Americans are busy. You Europeans sort it out!” However, European forces are too hollowed out, lack key enablers, and vital logistics, and their leaders are too lacking in political will to respond in force. President Putin knows that having overcome NATO’s conventional deterrent the Alliance faces a long war to recover the Baltic States and many Western European leaders simply lack the resolve to confront such a choice between war and peace.

Seizing the moment President Putin calls Chancellor Merkel and tells her that his ‘limited correction’ is over, that Russia is now content with the new strategic ‘balance’ in Europe, and that Moscow has no more territorial ambitions. He laments the fact that European leaders did not heed his warnings about NATO and EU enlargement, and the threat the twin enlargements posed to Russia. He even offers to compensate the families of the relatively few NATO force members killed during Russia’s ‘corrective’ operation.

At the same time, President Putin offers Chancellor Merkel a stark choice. It is the same choice Britain and France faced in 1939 over the defence of Poland. Having already traded space does she fight a war over for time and great cost to Germany to recover the Baltic States?

Merkel is faced with an appalling dilemma for which neither she nor contemporary Germany is prepared. London and Paris obfuscate and bluster but do nothing. With US forces committed to Asia-Pacific, southern Europeans engaged with the Middle East, Washington is too overstretched to respond in force in any of the three theatres in which major conflict has broken out.11 Moreover, NATO Europeans are too weak and divided to act as effective first responders, and in any case the Trump White House will not risk a nuclear confrontation with Russia over the Baltic States much though they abhor Russia’s actions. The EU’s European Council goes into emergency session to impose punitive sanctions on Russia. NATO’s bluff has been well and truly called and from Putin’s perspective the sanctions are merely a price worth paying.

**Just How Dangerous is Russia?**

Both the Wales Summit and the US European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) emphasised the need for the rapid reinforcement of Allies in the event of a crisis. However, such is the scale of Russian snap exercises, and the consequent threat they pose, that SACEUR General Breedlove has since shifted NATO’s ready force posture to forward deterrence and forward presence in an attempt to raise the threshold cost of any Russia military action.

The need for a shift in posture was vital. Just after Christmas 2015 President Putin signed into Russian law a new decree establishing five new ‘regional maritime counter-terrorist headquarters’. Although not directly aimed at the Baltic States the location and leadership of the centres speak to Russian strategy. Located in Dagestan, Murmansk, Kamchatka, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and Simferopol in Crimea, these isolated centres cover Russia’s borders from the Arctic, through the Black Sea, along the southern border and into Russia’s far-east. Crucially, they are all under the control of the successor to the KGB, the Federal Security Service or FSB.

The centres are all evidence of Moscow’s determination to extend its influence into the maritime domain as a means of strengthening Russia’s ability to contest ‘sovereignty’ at sea, as well as on land and in the air. Critically, the new centres also strengthen the so-called ‘vertikal’ through the FSB by reinforcing direct presidential control over all aspects of strategy and action, and further consolidate presidential power over Russia’s sprawling security and defence services. As such they fit into a pattern of such consolidations, led most

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11 The current level of US forces in Europe are 1 divisional headquarters, 3 brigade combat teams, 6 fighter squadrons, 1 tanker squadron, 1 transport squadron, 1 Special Operations Forces transport squadrons, 1 flagship and 4 AEGIS class destroyers.
notably by the creation of the **Centre for National Defence Management** at 22 Frunze Embankment in Moscow.

However, the much bigger picture which President Putin is painting is one in which confrontation with the West is central to the very existence of the state he leads. In that context the new centres are key pieces of an emerging architecture for the waging of what the Russians call 'new generation or non-linear warfare'. Hybrid warfare in the parlance of the West. Indeed, the reason why the centres are under the control of the FSB is precisely because the heirs of Felix Dzerzinsky are the masters of the disinformation and destabilisation strategies which are central to the conduct of hybrid warfare – war at and within the seams of open European societies.

Some suggest that the collapse of the oil price will force Russia into a period of strategic retrenchment. Russia has indeed cut its public investment budgets, and pulled back somewhat from the 2010 ambition to invest some $700bn in new military equipment by 2020. The current level of defence investment over the same period is closer to $300bn given the current exchange between the rouble and the dollar, which is little more than that of the UK.

However, even the most cursory study of President Putin reveals a man that is not easily diverted from his strategy of rebuilding Russian influence via intimidation. The one word which drives President Putin is ‘respect’. From his earliest days in Leningrad and the stories of Russia’s immense sacrifice during the 1941-1945 Great Patriotic War with which he grew up, Vladimir Putin has been driven by his vision of Russia as a great power. This ‘vision’ was reinforced by his first-hand witnessing of the collapse of Soviet power as a KGB Lieutenant-Colonel in Dresden, and his front row seat as a senior official during the crises, corruption and chaos of the Sobchak and Yeltsin years during the 1990s.

President Putin is thus a man firm in his determination never again to see Russia ‘humiliated’, either by itself or others. His aim is the preservation of the Russian state which he believes to be surrounded by enemies. To that end his beliefs can be thus summarised: the acquisitive West is not to be trusted (he has a latent vaguely Leninist belief that Western capitalism is both inherently corrupt and imperialist); that the West talks about a rules-based system but is hypocritical and only understands and listens to power; and only a powerful Russian state can stop corrupt politicians and officials from destroying the Russian state from within.

Putin despises what he sees as weakness and knows how to exploit it, and as so often he has chosen his timing carefully. President Putin demonstrated his *Realpolitik* capacity to act decisively and unexpectedly with the 2014 seizure of Crimea. He continues to destabilise Ukraine. One of the many seams he exploits is the incredulity of some of his strategically (and quite possibly historically-illiterate) Western counterparts.

In 2016 the West is distracted with US presidential elections, the ongoing migration crisis, and the Brexit referendum. How and to what extent President Putin decides to use his new mediums of confrontation will depend to some extent upon the impact of the collapsing oil and gas price on the Russian state, and his need to keep basic public services running. However, Russian state weakness, fear of Russia, and the fact of a divided West might contrive to give Russia more influence over its ‘near abroad’ than Western leaders would ideally like. After all, one purpose of hybrid warfare is to make an adversary fearful. Perhaps Russia’s greatest ‘ally’ is denial in key European states such as France and Germany, allied to Britain’s unprincipled ‘you can have any British policy you like as long as you pay for it’ mercantilism.

**Can NATO Defend Itself?**

“The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. No one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were
to be threatened. NATO will maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations, wherever it should arise.\(^\text{12}\)

The NATO Wales Summit Declaration.

The Warsaw Summit must at the very least re-commit the Alliance to the timely fulfilment of the programme of reform and strengthening agreed at the September 2014 NATO Wales Summit. Wales finally began to address the growing defence planning deficit with the Defence Investment Pledge. The key paragraphs warrant full quotation. “Allies currently meeting the NATO guideline to spend a minimum 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence will aim to continue to do so. Likewise, Allies spending more than 20% of their defence budgets on major equipment, including related Research and Development, will continue to do so”. However, the Declaration continues: “Allies whose current proportion of GDP spent on defence is below this level will: halt any decline in defence expenditure; aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows; aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade with a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets and filling NATO’s capability shortfalls”.\(^\text{13}\)

With a clear emphasis on force modernisation the Wales Declaration also states that: “Allies who currently spend less than 20% of their annual defence spending on major new equipment, including Research and Development, will aim within a decade to increase their annual investments to 20% or more of total defence expenditure”.\(^\text{14}\) And, that all, “…Allies will: ensure that their land, sea, air and maritime forces meet NATO agreed guidelines for deployability and sustainability and other agreed output metrics; ensure that their armed forces can operate together effectively, including through the implementation of agreed NATO standards and doctrines”.\(^\text{15}\)

It was also agreed at Wales that national progress would be reviewed annually. The US endeavoured to seed and reinforce such an effort by also committing in September 2014 to the European Re-assurance Initiative (ERI), investing up to $1bn to strengthen US forces in Europe, fund additional bilateral and multilateral exercises and training with Allies and partners, improve infrastructure to enable better and faster reinforcement, reception, and responsiveness of Allied forces, particularly to NATO’s east. The ERI also sought to enhance the pre-positioning of US military equipment in Europe, help build the military capacity of new NATO Allies and partners, and to strengthen the capacity of non-NATO partners.

Thus, the Warsaw Summit will need to address the changing the face of NATO’s two growing critical spaces – the battle space and the security space. To be strategically (as opposed to merely politically) credible Warsaw must also mark the creation of a truly twenty-first century Alliance driven by a contextually-relevant NATO Strategic Concept with collective defence, crisis management and co-operative security driving the defence and force planning choices of all the Allies.

Military alliances are created with two objectives in mind; to prevent wars and if needs be to win wars. Influence and effect are the two key strategic ‘commodities’ in which alliances ‘trade’. As such alliances rise and fall on the level of strategic unity of effort and purpose between members, and the level of interoperability between credibly-capable armed forces. Lose either or both and an alliance is effectively crippled.

If the September 2014 Summit will come to be remembered as a kind of part-Ukraine driven NATO ‘schwerpunkt’, the Warsaw Summit should invoke the ambition and strategic imagination to mark NATO’s true strategic renovation. Certainly, if the defence planning deficit is to be reduced re-connecting European security to world security could be said to be Warsaw’s Prime Directive. Such a re-connection will be vital if the concept of Alliance 360 degree adaptation is to mean more than another catchy pre-summit buzz-phrase.
NATO faces a coterie of threats to its east, south, and north. And, potentially to the West as well, if one considers the pejorative comments about NATO made by the presumptive Republican candidate for the White House, Donald Trump. Russian forces continue to dismember Ukraine and Moscow seems committed to the further intimidation of the Baltic States, as well as to keeping several so-called frozen conflicts around the Alliance's border well and truly frozen.

Further afield Afghanistan's future is again in doubt, whilst ISIS fanatics threaten an already unstable Middle Eastern state structure. Over the medium-to-not-so-long-term rapidly developing cyber, missile and nuclear technologies threaten to combine into a form of strategic hybrid war which could well become THE way of war in the twenty-first century. And, all of the above is happening whilst an ever-more overstretched United States and its allies in Asia-Pacific face an increasingly aggressive China determined to extend its sovereign footprint way beyond any limit that could or would be sanctioned by international law.

Is Europe Serious About Defence?
The Wales Summit Declaration and the Defence Investment Pledge rightly made much of the need for NATO members to spend a minimum of 2% GDP on defence. However, not enough has been made of just what future force such expenditures must generate. The 2% benchmark will only be politically credible if national leaders are convinced not just by how much to spend on their respect armed forces, but the defence outcomes such expenditure would realise and why. 'Value for money' is today's essential defence mantra as much as strategic influence and effect, and it is likely to continue to be so.

There are clear lessons from history which point to inflection points in strategy and Warsaw could well become one of those moments which resonates. On 21 March, 1918, strengthened by the collapse of Tsarist Russia, the Imperial German Army launched Operation Michael. It was a desperate attempt by Berlin to break the British before the Americans arrived in strength and thus to win World War One. In the early days of the battle German Stormtroopers made stunning gains. This was not simply due to force and feat of arms. Britain and France, as well as the British Cabinet under Prime Minister David Lloyd George, were dangerously split over strategy. On one side, the so-called 'westerners' believed that the war could only be won by defeating the Germans Army in the fields of Flanders. On the other side, the so-called 'easterners' believed that somehow the Kaiser could be defeated by attacking Germany's flanks in Turkey and elsewhere. This lack of strategic unity of effort and purpose denuded the British defences in the critical area around the 1916 Somme battlefield.

Thankfully, in the year or so since 1916 the British Army had made truly revolutionary advances in military strategy and tactics. Rather than break the British retreated in reasonable order and as they did so they steadily reduced the ranks of the elite Stormtroopers until the exhausted Imperial Germany Army could advance no more.

On 8 August, 1918 at the Battle of Amiens, on what General Ludendorff called "the black day of the German Army", British Commonwealth forces, with French and American support, launched a massive counter-attack in which the British employed an entirely new form of manoeuvre warfare, the All Arms Battle. Aircraft, tanks, artillery and infantry operated together in close support of each other to smash through the German forces. What subsequently became known as the Hundred Days Offensive effectively ended world War One.

Today NATO is facing the political equivalent of Operation Michael. Allied leaders are strategically uncertain and deeply split about what to do about Russia's illegal incursions into Ukraine, and its growing preponderance over NATO forces in the Baltic Sea region. This split is not cosmetic and reflects a lack of strategic unity of effort and purpose, with NATO divided between those who simply seek American protection, and a group of Europeans who see military force as mere adjunct to soft power. Only Britain and France make any serious effort to generate the expeditionary military capability needed to remain militarily close to an increasingly over-stretched America. However, after a decade of continuous operations and defence cuts the small British and French armed forces are only now being rebuilt and such re-
builds take time. Therefore, if the Warsaw Summit is to be the platform upon which a twenty-first century Alliance is resurrected leaders will need to take the first steps to re-establish some semblance of strategically-relevant, militarily-credible force upon which all influence, deterrence and defence depends.

Therefore, at Warsaw NATO must go back to its military roots and radically reconsider the utility of force in the pursuit of strategy, and with it a NATO Future Force fit for twenty-first century, not twentieth century purpose. Warsaw must take three important decisions. Article 5 collective defence must be modernised and re-organised around cyber-defence, missile defence and the development of advanced European deployable forces vital to contemporary defence via both increases in capability and capacity. In effect, a twenty-first century All Arms Battle must be forged by the NDPP with NATO forces far better configured to fight the new way of warfare by operating to effect across the global commons and the eight contemporary domains of warfare – air, sea, land, cyber, space, information, resilience and knowledge.

Allied crisis management must also be seen as part of the extended escalation needed to fight hybrid warfare, which is implicit in the order of battle, and thus again part of a new All Arms Battle. To that end, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), the VJTF, eNRF, and critically the Graduated Readiness Forces (GRFs), must be radically re-structured. In specific terms in the event of the need for rapid and huge force generation the Alliance would face enormous Reinforcement, Staging, and Onward Movement (RSOM) challenges due to the loss of capacity, assets and skills, not to mention forces. The last REFORGER exercise was in 1988, whilst for the British the last such exercise was LIONHEART in 1984. This would better enable the Alliance to effectively force generate and efficiently command and control complex coalitions across the mission spectrum from high-end warfare to the kind of hybrid/ambiguous warfare that Moscow is employing in Ukraine. The wider NATO Force Structure must be re-configured to offer a far greater and credible level of rapid and heavy reinforcement given the danger that the Americans might be busy elsewhere at any moment of crisis.

Co-operative security must also be better embedded in extended escalation. This means Alliance forces and resources far better configured to work with all of NATO’s strategic partners the world over; states and institutions, military and civilians alike, if the Alliance is to remain a credible factor in American grand strategy, as well as European security.

Such a Future Force (or rather future forces) would combine the current planning concepts of NATO 2020, Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative into a twenty-first century All Arms Battle with the NDPP driving deep or organic jointness between NATO forces acting as the vital synergy mechanism. Such a planning concept would begin to enable Allies to strike a necessary balance between strategy, capability, capacity and affordability. The challenge? To generate such a force would require a shared level of political ambition notably lacking of late, something which Moscow has been all too happy to exploit.

Is NATO’s Defence and Deterrence Posture Credible?

The essential problem for NATO is that the Alliance’s conventional deterrent is too weak, and the strategic deterrent too massive, to be a credible deterrent of a Russian-led limited war. Deterrence theory relies on an essentially simple premise; that in the event of war an adversary can never be sure that the attacked will not resort to the use of nuclear weapons and has the will, capability and intent so to do. In NATO’s case the theory is adjusted to include the nuclear defence of the territory of allies, not just the three NATO nuclear weapons states. However, given the weaknesses in the political classes of all three NATO nuclear states, America, Britain and France, it is open to question these days whether they would credibly consider resorting to the use of such weapons. They would certainly not do so if faced with an essentially limited war on NATO’s eastern flank, and they would be correct. Nor does Moscow does

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16 Only one of the 9 GRF/High Readiness Force (Land) HQs is on NRF alert for 12 months at any one time. The other eight are not available to NATO on a day-to-day basis, although in theory one could ‘re-rolled’ to NATO in an emergency.
believe so given that the Gerasimov Doctrine explicitly suggests a warfighting role for nuclear weapons. Consequently, doubts over the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent posture are growing, and Warsaw must move to quash them by at least recommitting the nations to a nuclear Alliance.

The challenge for NATO defence and deterrence is to remain credible given the rapid shift taking place in the military balance of power away from the liberal powers towards the illiberal powers. If urgent action by NATO and its nations is not taken at Warsaw, or the subsequent summit in Washington (?), the European members of the Alliance will find themselves ever more vulnerable to strategic shock.

In December 1941, at Pearl Harbor, the United States Pacific Fleet was struck by a ‘bolt from the blue’ as the Imperial Japanese Navy sank or damaged much of the American fleet at anchor. During the Cold War the US strategic community was constantly exercised by the threat of a nuclear ‘bolt from the blue’ from the Soviet Union. This led to the First and Second Offset Strategies which were designed to counter what was seen as potentially decisive Soviet advantages. The First Offset Strategy took place in the 1950s when President Eisenhower called for enhanced nuclear deterrence to offset perceived Soviet superiority in conventional forces. The Second Offset Strategy took place in the wake of the Vietnam War when particular emphasis was placed on surveillance systems and precision-guided munitions to offset defence cuts, and a perceived weakness in Washington’s willingness to engage US forces. Today a Third Offset Strategy is in the offing from the Americans. Having been unveiled in November 2014 the aim of the strategy is to exploit technology, big data, miniaturisation, and other advanced technologies. The idea is to create a ‘Dreadnought’ moment for the Americans. In 1906 the British launched the first all-big gun, armoured, turbine-driven battleship which at a stroke made all other warships of the time obsolete, including Britain’s own mighty Royal Navy. Europeans?

The Americans are not simply concerned about the growing threat from asymmetric attack, but by the growing obsolescence and thus diminishing credibility of NATO as a nuclear alliance. In the years after the Cold War it appeared that the threat of nuclear mutually assured destruction or M.A.D. had been cast into history. However, Russia’s rattling of nuclear sabres almost weekly, with both new INF Treaty-busting Iskander M and Khir/Klub/Kalibr intermediate-range nuclear weapons systems deployed in and around NATO borders. The age of Euromissiles has returned and nuclear deterrence is clearly back on the strategic agenda, and should be firmly on the Warsaw agenda.

Critically, NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and posture is perceived as lacking credibility. Paradoxically, it is a failure made all the more likely by the weakness of NATO’s conventional forces in deterring the kind of ‘limited war with big weapons’ strategy for which Moscow is clearly preparing. Russia is trying to use nuclear superiority, and a growing capability in anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, to effect a key dictum of Sun Tzu; that the ‘best’ wars are built on an irresistible fait accompli. In other words, a bolt from the blue.

The US nuclear arsenal is now also having to play a multipolar deterrent role the world over which leads to a very different strategic calculus than the bipolar strategic symbiosis that existed for much

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17 In April 1985 Marshal N.V. Ogarkov wrote: “The history of war convincingly testifies to the constant contradiction between the means of attack and defence. The appearance of new means of attack has always [inevitably] led to the creation of counter-action, and thus in the final analysis has led to the developments of new methods for conducting engagements, battles and operations [and war in general]”. The so-called Gerasimov Doctrine, named after the Russian Chief of the General Staff is in effect an updating of the Ogarkov Doctrine. See, Lindley-French J. “The Gerasimov Doctrine: History Teaches Vigilance”, in “Global Trade”, August 13th, 2015.

18 The Iskander M (SS-26 Stone) claims a range of 500kms, but is believed to have a far greater range and able to carry multiple nuclear warheads. The 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty eliminated missiles with a range of between 500 and 5500kms. The Khir/Klub/Kalibr cruise missile (SS-30a – ‘Sizzler’) has a range far in excess of 500kms but probably no longer that 4000kms.

of the Cold War. France has a robust nuclear policy and some ‘sub-strategic’ nuclear forces, although in practice the French no longer distinguish between strategic and sub-strategic nuclear forces. However, its limited sub-strategic air-based nuclear force could well be unable to penetrate an increasingly sophisticated Russian air defence system. The British (being the British these days) are about to spend some £31bn on the so-called “Successor” submarine-based strategic nuclear system, whilst British political leaders (and not just Jeremy Corbyn) repeatedly imply they would never use the weapon under any circumstances.

Paradoxically, the nuclear capabilities assigned to NATO should be more than enough to deter against a nuclear attack by any major power, and yet appear to be utterly unusable in the event of the nuclear-fringed conventional threat Russia poses. Even in the case of a nuclear strike by a state like Iran it is hard to see that any of the three NATO nuclear powers would respond in kind to Tehran’s use of one or two first generation warheads, even against a NATO ally.

Put simply, neither Britain nor France would likely conceive of using nuclear weapons unless as a response to nuclear use by an enemy, and for all the rhetoric to the contrary, neither power would use such weapons unless their own soil had been so attacked. This creates a problem of ‘decoupled proportionality’ which in turn renders NATO’s nuclear deterrent posture increasingly incredible.

Worse, NATO’s conventional and nuclear deterrents are in danger of becoming ‘de-coupled’ with no credible ‘escalation’ on offer from the use of conventional forces to the use of nuclear forces. It is a ‘de-coupling that is reinforced by a dangerous estrangement from NATO itself of the three nuclear weapons’ states. The US sees NATO very much as a side-show. The British talk NATO but never match words with deeds. The French have only just re-entered the NATO integrated command structure and remain NATO-sceptics, in much the same way the British remain inveterate EU-sceptics.

Consequently, NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) is kept at the margins of defence planning precisely because NATO’s 28, soon-to-be 29, nations cannot agree about whether to deter Russia or debate with Russia. As for NATO’s ‘dual-capable aircraft’ (DCA), most of which belong to the Alliance’s non-nuclear states, these are legacy systems that whilst capable of carrying nuclear weapons would no longer get through Russia’s air defences.

In April, the first elements of the new NATO missile defence shield (or European Phased Adaptive Approach or EPAA to give it its very American official moniker) were switched on. And yet the system is not designed to deter/defend against the most likely threat. Therefore, the EPAA is the wrong system, defending inadequately against the wrong people, incapable of being upgraded to defend against a Russian threat (whatever Moscow says), and paid for by an American taxpayer who it is also incapable of defending. In other words, NATO missile defence does not fly strategically, politically, or technically, and yet gives Moscow every opportunity to cry foul.

Another danger posed by the decoupling of NATO’s conventional and nuclear deterrents is the danger that the nuclear use threshold will fall if the choice on offer to Alliance leaders in the event of a Russian attack on the Baltic States is nuke or surrender. By deploying short and intermediate range nuclear systems Russia is implying that it has already lowered the nuclear threshold, intimidating its neighbours with implied and applied irrationality. Again, much of what is today called the Gerasimov doctrine (after the Chief of the Russian General Staff) looks much like the Ogarkov doctrine of the early 1980s, which also implied a warfighting role for nuclear weapons.

And yet a failure to defend the Baltic States could well mark the failure of NATO itself, which of course is precisely what President Putin wants. Therefore, if a credible defence is to be established such a defence must be placed in its proper strategic context. First, NATO must protect both its eastern and southern flanks. That means conventional forces in sufficient strength to deter, prevent and interdict on both flanks. Second, to defend the Baltic States, NATO conventional forces must be forward deployed in sufficient strength to the region to act as a trip-wire to further and real Alliance escalation in the event of Russian aggression. In other words, NATO needs a forward deployed NATO forward deterrent. Third,
the Russians must not be allowed to plan an attack that joins Kaliningrad to Belarus at little or no cost via the Suwalki Gap. Kaliningrad must be considered a NATO target for conventional forces in the event of Russian aggression— even if Russia deploys Iskander M and other nuclear systems to the enclave. Fourth, NATO forces must be able to rapidly reinforce in strength to block any breach of Alliance defences.

Given those challenges it is NATO’s ability to escalate conventionally that is most in need of attention if NATO deterrence is to be restored to credibility. Behind the VJTF and eNRF a powerful conventional forces must be deployed forward in Poland that increases the risk to Moscow’s forces and bases of even the most limited of incursions. At the very least this would need a NATO force that would look something like a very souped-up version of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force of the past, which combined both mass and manoeuvre.\(^{20}\)

Therefore, the Warsaw Summit should enshrine a new four-track approach. Track one would involve the reinvigoration of the conventional and nuclear deterrents of the Alliance. Specifically, the three Alliance nuclear weapons states would publicly re-commit to the credible maintaining of NATO as a nuclear alliance (and mean it). Track two would see the 26 other NATO nations re-commit to enhancing their conventional forces as part of a reinvigorated NATO non-nuclear deterrent, with the stated aim to keep the threshold for nuclear use high. Track three would see the Alliance put forward new arms control proposals designed to lessen tensions between Russia and the Alliance via an initial redeployment of both nuclear and conventional forces, but only in the event of a change of policy in Moscow. Track four would see the Alliance consider the implications of a full-scale INF Treaty break-out by the Russians, and the implications for NATO nuclear forces.

Do Political NATO and Military NATO Agree About War?
The purpose of a Strategic Concept is to demonstrate grip of strategic reality on the part of political leaders and that military leaders understand the strategic mission which they have been assigned. For all the concerns stated above much will be made by Alliance political leaders at the Warsaw Summit of the defence planning progress made since the NATO Wales Summit. There has indeed been some progress, such as the working up of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and the enhanced NATO Response Force (eNRF).

However, critical to the development of those two vital forces is the exercising and training vital to render them credible as forces (and thus deterrents). And yet there seems to be a distinct mismatch between political and military NATO about the progress made thus far, particularly on force development. Indeed, whilst NATO HQ in Brussels continues to brief that the exercising of both the VJTF and the eNRF are proceeding as planned, the exercise planners complain of being starved of funding, and that the critical lessons-learned from each major exercise are not being distributed across NATO, or properly acted upon across the Alliance force structure. Worse, whilst NATO’s cutting edge forces looked good on paper they lack critical elements, particularly key enablers and logistics, which they assume will be provided by the Americans.

Furthermore, the planning assumptions driving the size, scope and fighting power of the NATO forces seem to bear little or no relation to what Russia could bring to bear in the early phases of a rolling and aggregating hybrid warfare campaign against the Baltic States. At present Russia could bring far more forces into action in Eastern Europe than NATO, and far more quickly. Therefore, if deterrence fails NATO is faced with the option of either having to fight a long war, or accepting the de facto loss of the Baltic States.

Furthermore, there seems to be absolutely no global situational awareness at the level of European heads of state and government, or little appetite to really consider just how dangerous the situation is across the Middle East and North

\(^{20}\) In fact, the AMF did not have much mass and was incapable of much manoeuvre. It only comprised of 7 infantry battalions, a recce troop with a few light tanks, and a 105mm artillery battery. Only 4 of the battalions could deploy at once whilst AMF (Air) had access to 7 squadrons only.
Africa (MENA). The possibility of wholesale state collapse across MENA is plausible and the implications for Europe enormous. Again, what if a conflict breaks out in Asia-Pacific and in Europe at the same time? Would an over-stretched America be able to continue to fill the gaps in Europe’s defences caused by the strategic indolence of its leaders?

Therefore, if the Warsaw Summit achieves anything it MUST begin to close NATO’s yawning strategy-reality-capability-affordability gap by re-focusing all Alliance structures on the worst-case. If not the West’s enemies and adversaries will drive a T-90S Russian tank straight through the enormous chasm that now exists between what the political and policy leaders seem to think military NATO can do, and what military NATO knows it can actually do.

**Can Central Europe Influence Europe’s Defence?**

History is of course eloquent in Europe. Equally, one must be careful not to draw too many historical parallels. Equally, if history does not repeat itself (and by definition it cannot) patterns of power do, as do the conditioned reflexes of states to power. Whilst much of NATO’s attention is focussed to the Alliance’s east and south, as the duty of such a structure is to consider what threat lies beyond it, the political stability and balance of power of Central Europe must be and will be implicit at the Warsaw Summit.

Much is made of the positions of the four major NATO powers – America, Britain, France and Germany. However, since the accession of former Warsaw Pact states into the Alliance NATO’s political centre of gravity has tended to move eastwards away from the Anglo-American-Canadian Atlantic community towards Germany and its neighbours. That shift has in turn emphasised the growing importance of the EU in Central European security, and the need for real and effective EU-NATO co-operation which has profound implications for defence planning.

On 25 May, 2016 the Visegrad Group of Defence Ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia agreed to further develop defence co-operation. The choices the four Central European states are making collectively is indicative of a changing Europe and a changing NATO. Under the rubric of ‘V4 co-operation’ the four states place particular emphasis on the need for rapid certification of the EU V4 Battle Group, a V4 permanent ‘modular’ force, and multinational air training in defence planning.

The V4 also call on the Warsaw Summit to deliver “robust...deliverables” to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, and specifically demand the deployment of a strong Alliance forward presence on the Eastern flank, with particular reference to the Suwalki Gap. The V4 are also looking to play a higher-profile role in the Baltic States by deploying a force to the region in 2017 to support NATO exercises.

The Joint Declaration states that the V4 also want to co-operate fully in the development of the EU’s *Global Strategy*, “…as well as the possible follow-on document focussing on EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. This work provides further opportunity to enhance NATO-EU co-operation”.21 Critically, the ministers also look to more EU permanent structured co-operation in the fields of CBRN Defence, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers, Training and Education, Joint Logistic Support Group, and Special Operations Tactical Training. They also seek to promote “…close contacts between the V4 and the European Defence Agency to prepare [the] ground for co-operative regional projects, including smart sharing models, opportunities for multinational procurement and alignment of replacement cycles, and developing business cases for our defence industries”.22

Various groupings have been created to increase the influence of the Central European powers via enhanced partnerships across the region. The most notable of these are the Weimar Forum, and of course the Visegrad Group. In reality they all

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21 Only one of the 9 GRF/High Readiness Force (Land) HQs is on NRF alert for 12 months at any one time. The other eight are not available to NATO on a day-to-day basis, although in theory one could ‘re-rolled’ to NATO in an emergency.

22 *Idem.*
have essentially one purpose; to ensure Central Europeans do not swap one form of externally-imposed hegemony for another, however liberal the intentions of said external power.23

This concern is particularly apparent for the Law and Justice Party government in Warsaw in its tussle with the Constitutional Court over the very composition of the court, the power of the judiciary to strike down laws passed by the Sejm, and the attitude of the European Commission towards Polish parliamentary sovereignty. This is not a phenomenon confined to Poland. British parliamentarians are also increasingly uneasy about the de facto alliance of judges, the European Commission, and the European Court of Justice, as well as the penchant of judges to claim an undemocratic mandate with the backing of the European institutions based on the primacy of European law over national law. In many ways, this may well be a struggle that comes to define this European age.

There is indeed a danger that the European Commission’s application of a “rule of law” mechanism will be seen by many Poles as an attempt by Brussels, with Chancellor Merkel’s backing, to impose extra-territorial sovereignty on the Polish people. Given the critical role Poland played in freeing Central and Eastern Europe from Soviet oppression such actions, if not handled with the utmost sensitivity, could well come to be perceived as the hegemony of an increasingly rejected Berlin-Brussels axis. Certainly, implicit in the Brexit referendum is a rejection by much of the British people of the self-creeping competence of the Berlin-backed Brussels institutions at the expense of parliamentary sovereignty.

Similar concerns are self-evident in the position taken by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban in the face of the hyper-migration crisis that Europe continues to face. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the re-imposition of borders in contravention of European law, first by Budapest and then by others, marked a failure of the EU and in particular Schengen Area members, to cope with the crisis and more critically to remain cohesive in the face of the crisis.

When faced with such society-bending immigration Budapest’s decision to close its borders was followed by several governments, most notably in Austria where the right-wing Freedom Party narrowly failed to win May’s presidential elections, but nevertheless holds key portfolios in government.

Furthermore, the rejection by several Central European states of the Commission’s proposals to spread irregular migrants across the EU was seen by many in the region as a direct consequence of Chancellor Merkel’s unilateral 2015 decision to open German borders to all refugees. Her attempt via the Commission to impose Germany’s choice on the rest of the EU has caused deep resentment in many capitals. This was not least because her ‘Open Door’ decision was taken irrespective of the impact such migration flows could have on what are still by European standards relatively poor societies, unused to high levels of sudden inward migration, and the inevitable cultural and economic friction that results.

Why does this matter for NATO? A political-military alliance is founded first and foremost on strategic unity of effort and purpose. One reason it has proven so hard to mount a credible deterrence and response against Russia’s illegal 2014 action in Ukraine, the pressure against the Baltic States, or the migration-multiplied threat to Europeans posed by ISIS, is precisely because Europeans are so profoundly split over how to manage both crises. President Putin’s sense that European leaders are paper tigers has certainly contributed to his at best part-implementation of the Minsk I agreement, and his very partial implementation of Minsk II.

Is the Balance of Power in NATO Europe Shifting?
Traditionally, the essential balance of power within Europe was built around two poles of state power; a nexus of German economic power and the combined economic and military power of Britain and France. It is a balance of power that is very real but which many EU officials in particular find very uncomfortable. To maintain this balance and to exert influence over it Poland has moved to rebuild its

23 The issue of the role of the EU as both constrainer and enabler is tricky. For example, the latest Pew Research suggests the strongest support for the EU can be found among the citizens of the Central European states with Poland on top with a 78% approval rating. See “Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit”, 8 June, 2016 www.pewresearch.org/topics/europe
relationship with Britain, Europe’s leading non-Russian military power and second biggest economy after a testy period. Conscious of the need to maintain such a balance Berlin by and large accepts the need for such relationships, even if Germany remains committed to the creation of some form of hybrid-federation, and even if states such as Britain (and Poland?) would rather see the construction of a super-alliance of sovereign states.

There are deep, structural forces at play which are implicit in what is in effect a crisis of governance in Europe that will have profound implications for the future of NATO. It is a crisis which will also have a particular impact on the relationship between the so-called European and North American pillars of the Euro-Atlantic Community. The April 2016 visit of President Obama to Britain to effectively instruct the British people to vote to remain within the EU clearly suggests that Washington now sees Germany as its primary partner in Europe, with a United States of Europe a long-term US policy goal.

Now, this position may change quickly when either Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump is elected president in November 2016. However, over the life of the current Administration there has been an historic downgrading of the ‘special relationship’ with Britain, and an historic upgrading in America’s relationship with Germany. This shift further legitimises German leadership and makes it more likely that Central European powers will be steadily subsumed into some form of hybrid federation organised around Germany.

For a proud state such as Poland this causes a profound dilemma. The way power works inside the EU makes it very hard for dissenting states such as Britain, or on occasions Poland, to stop the march towards a well-intentioned, but nevertheless German-led EU hybrid federation, especially when and if Poland eventually joins the Euro to which Warsaw is committed.

The only way Britain and Poland can counter such power is to form a countervailing alliance of EU member-states outside of the Eurozone and insist on a new political settlement to confirm that. For Poland a British exit from the EU would thus be a disaster. Equally, whilst David Cameron’s cherished renegotiation of Britain’s place in the EU did not amount to much it might just imply such a relationship. Poland has tried to counter Britain’s drift by taking a more robust role but, with respect, Poland is not Britain and lacks the power to lead alternatives. Indeed, Poland is clearly in liberal Germany’s orbit because of geographical location and relative geopolitical influence. And, whilst all and any such allusions with the past must be resisted, power is still power.

Because of the facts of power Warsaw has rightly invested a lot of energy in the relationship with Berlin, as to be fair has Germany in its relationship with Poland. Moreover, whilst driven undoubtedly and primarily by Warsaw’s legitimate concerns about Russian aggression Poland’s march towards achieving the NATO 2% of GDP on defence spending guideline must also be seen as part of an attempt to help balance German economic and political power in Europe with military power.

**What is the EU Planning?**

On June 28, a week or so before the Warsaw Summit (and conveniently a week after the Brexit vote) an EU Summit will take place at which EU High Representative Federica Mogherini will unveil a “Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy”. The document states that, “... [EU] security and defence is where a step change is most urgent”, and suggests that, “...in turbulent times, we need a compass to navigate the waters of faster-changing world”.

The Strategy goes on, “The EU can step up its contribution to Europe’s security and defence”, and that “Our external action must become more joined-up across policy areas, institutions and member-states. Greater unity of purpose is needed across the policy areas making up our external action”.

At the heart of the proposals are a new EU civil-military headquarters, equipment, intelligence

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24 See The Times, “Juncker’s Tin Soldiers”. 27 May, 2016 (digital version)
25 Idem.
26 Idem.
and force pooling, as well as the creation of a European Council of Defence Ministers (ECDM). The ECDM would not imply the creation of High Commissioners as once proposed for the command of the failed European Defence Community between 1952 and 1954. In the first instance the moves towards a European Defence Union (EDU) would still be intergovernmental in both nature and structure. However, there can be no question that for some such a move at such a time could act as the harbinger of a future European army.

The language the Global Strategy uses is also inter-governmental rather than federalist. It refers to “joined-up” rather than ‘integrated’ and Mogherini is believed to be far more lukewarm about the idea of a European army than Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker. The proposal is also perfectly in line with the Lisbon Treaty. However, at the heart of the security and defence components in the EU Global Strategy is indeed an implied form of hybrid-federalism by which smaller powers would integrate themselves around Germany and through the European Union. That is why nine EU member-states led by Germany will use Permanent Structured Co-operation as agreed under the 2009 Lisbon Treaty to move towards European Defence Union that Germany is also likely to reveal in its forthcoming July Defence "Weissbuch".

One thing is clear; neither NATO nor the EU can continue to occupy their respective current political spaces. The status quo ante is not on option given the change taking place both within the institutions and beyond them. For the Alliance the specific issue at hand is the relationship between NATO and a future EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that emerges from the hybrid-federation. And, whether over time CSDP could emerge as THE European pillar of NATO – both part of the Alliance and yet autonomous to it. Indeed, to an extent such a relationship is implied by the inclusion of NATO-EU relations on the Warsaw agenda, even if such an outcome remains distant.

However, the challenges faced by CSDP are manifold and must not be under-estimated. Since ESDP became CSDP with the Lisbon Treaty the ‘C’ has by and large remained silent. Rather, CSDP has become ESDP-plus, still much closer to the Franco-British view of EU security and defence as set out in the 1998 St Malo Declaration, than the vision for defence union in the ill-fated European Defence Community. Consequently, CSDP has continued to be quite useful to the British and the French, the two European powers that really matter in such matters, precisely because it remains intergovernmental and not as yet quasi-federal.

Moreover, CSDP is useful. The flag one puts atop a military campaign is almost as important as the force one deploys into a complex security environment. Take Libya. There is much talk about an Italian-led EU operation to stabilise the Libyan coast around Sirte and thus help disrupt what is feared to be an ISIS foothold in the country, and to further disrupt the hyper-people-smuggling that is destabilising Europe and taking so many lives. One could not imagine such a force operating in that environment under a NATO, UK, French, let alone an American flag. Therefore, having the option of operating under an EU flag communicates a very distinctive political message about the identity, and indeed the nature and purpose of a deployed force. For that reason CSDP affords European powers political options in a crisis, at least in theory.

However, the essential problem for both NATO and the EU is that the countries that actually want CSDP are those that have neither a strong strategic culture nor many forces to hand. For them a truly common CSDP is to some extent attractive for it would absolve their political leaders of responsibility for sending national forces on unpopular foreign adventures. Given that political context the ‘c’ in CSDP for such countries is a small ‘c’ which stands for weakness. Hungary is a case in point for whilst Budapest often sides with Britain on matters of national sovereignty in EU crises, Hungary’s lamentably low level of defence investment suggests CSDP could one day be an attractive way of avoiding expensive force modernisation, even if Budapest remains opposed to political integration. Poland is most decidedly not one of those countries with its own, long and proud strategic culture. However, Warsaw also faces the conundrum of where and how best to generate strategic influence and effect and at the same time balance cost, affordability, efficiency and efficacy. Would a new EU-NATO strategic defence planning partnership help ease such concerns?
What are the Strategic Implications of Brexit?

In 1953 Prime Minister Winston Churchill famously said of the European Defence Community: "We are with them, but not of them". Nothing much has changed. If an EU hybrid-federation does emerge built around Germany it is likely over time the Alliance would be re-ordered into an Anglo-sphere comprised of America, Britain and Canada, and a Eurosphere organised by and around Berlin. Britain has made it perfectly clear that the British armed forces will not be part of such a structure, and that is indeed implicit in Cameron's claims to have negotiated a 'special status' for Britain in the EU which excludes the British from ever closer political (and by extension military) union.

Such a restructuring of the Alliance would have profound implications not just for Poland but the whole of Central Europe. Even if Britain votes to stay in the EU London's relationship will remain semi-detached as the UK will not join either the Euro or Schengen. However, the need is pressing for a new political settlement to realise the hybrid-federation, and the relationship between those within it and those without. The most likely position for Britain is to emerge as the leader of those on the outside as part of some grand bargain between Britain and Germany. As Britain increasingly eclipses France as the EU's second economic power then such a bargain might just be in the interests of both Berlin and London. The alternative is that Berlin presses of regardless convinced a hybrid-federation is the only way to enshrine German leadership at the heart of the EU, protect German taxpayers from the consequences of endless transfers of moneys from the north and west of Europe to the south and east, and impose some form of reformist discipline on the EU and its member-states. If Britain votes to leave the EU then all bets are off. Poland?

Can Germany Lead European Defence?

It would be far too much of a stretch to suggest that the words often applied to NATO's first secretary-general Lord Bruce Ismay still pertain; that the purpose of the Alliance was to keep Russia out, Germany down, and the Americans in. However, there would still be some truth in the assertion that whilst NATO remains vital to keeping the Russian out, and the Americans in, it is also a vital mechanism for helping to balance German power. The difference with the past is that whilst Berlin continues to pursue German national interests with some vigour most German leaders would agree with the need for German power to be legitimately embedded in institutions such as the EU and NATO. In the words of that now hackneyed phrase – a European Germany rather than a German Europe.

The German dilemma has thus become a German conundrum. It is a conundrum that is particularly apparent in Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. Equally, there is an irony in the fact of the V4; it is German liberal power and influence, which has grown markedly over the past decade, which defines and assures order on much of the continent. However, the new German order expresses itself more through the EU than NATO, primarily because American military power continues to mask German political and economic influence. The reality of contemporary German power also in part explains why both NATO and the EU are in their various ways facing turbulence in the respective relationships with the three major powers on the continent’s periphery – Britain, Russia and Turkey.

Germany has no choice but to lead much of Europe and maintain political momentum within the EU, but where does Germany fit into European defence? That question is another one of those NATO/CSDP imponderables. Once the Brexit brouhaha has calmed down the real fight for the future of Europe will begin during which both the relevance and ambition of CSDP will be tested, as well as the strength of Germany's commitment to common security and defence structures. However, Germany is a long way from being Europe's leading military power which critically undermines its own ability to shape CSDP in its own image, or at least pursue its own interests by creating a new
framework in which to embed both Berlin's use of force and its forces.28

Therefore, in the coming political struggle over CSDP there will likely be three sides. On one of the three sides there will be the British desperately trying to keep CSDP decidedly intergovernmental, probably with the quiet but incomplete support of the French as Paris as ever tried to play one side off against another. On one of the other sides there will be the genuine Euro-federalists led by the Brussels supra-elite which will seek to expand ever closer political and economic union towards a true defence union. On a third very German side Berlin will seek a kind of CSDP-plus, i.e. their own version of a European Defence Union to push towards the creation of the hybrid federation, possibly with the support of Berlin's new best friend Washington.

Poland and other Central and Eastern European EU and NATO members will either be forced to choose, or more likely endeavour to maintain a degree of defence sovereignty by playing the other groups off against each other. After all, such a stance is implied by the V4 Declaration. For Warsaw there is certainly likely to be some opportunity to leverage influence over the debate, albeit with the caveat that at some point Poland might be forced to choose.

Why would CSDP be central to German-led ideas of European defence? Precisely because CSDP combines elements of both EU supranationalism and enhanced intergovernmentalism, which are very the hallmarks of Berlin’s well-intentioned ideas for a partial liberal hegemony exercised through the EU. However, it is a fragile vision and an even more fragile structure and one wonders if such ‘leadership’ could survive the fall of Chancellor Merkel. Equally, it is no coincidence that Berlin is considering including the concept of a European Defence Union (EDU) in its defence white paper.

Would a European Defence Union Work?
With absolutely no particular power malice aforethought, but determined to exercise German leadership under Berlin’s concept of EDU, ‘ever closer defence union’ would in effect be applied to all EU member-states except Germany. Berlin would claim a form of American-style exceptionalism within CSDP similar to that which Berlin ‘enjoys’ today in the Eurozone, on the basis that Germany is the paymaster of last resort. Berlin would also no doubt claim that if there is to be a European Defence Union then at least one power would need to remain free to play the role of Leviathan to ensure compliance.

However, EDU would probably fail for three reasons. First, one very important design purpose of CSDP is to weaken a fundamental pillar of the state, to ensure the security and defence of its citizens, by transferring state sovereignty over time to the Brussels institutions. Second, defence more than any other area of state competence is about power. As indicated above, in 2015 IISS placed Britain as the world’s fourth biggest defence spender. With a defence budget of $56bn Britain spends some $9bn per annum more than France, and some $20bn more than Germany. Third, if a state spends 2% of its GDP on defence and yet decisions are being taken on the use of that force by people coming from states that spend far less, either said state would not join such a common mechanism, or said state would reduce its expenditure to the lowest common denominator of shared CSDP investment. In time CSDP and the defence of Europe would thus fail.

Therefore, if CSDP is to be credible it must stop being used as a back-door to some form of hybrid supranationalism and take its proper place in the gamut of mutually-reinforcing security and defence tools available to Europeans in the twenty-first century. In other words, take implied EU supranationalism out of the mix and CSDP might actually begin to work within the defence planning continuum provided by NATO. If not, and a European Defence Union moves forward, NATO and the EU will again find themselves in strategic competition possibly to the detriment of both.

28 The issue of the role of the EU as both constrainer and enabler is tricky. For example, the latest Pew Research suggests the strongest support for the EU can be found among the citizens of the Central European states with Poland on top with a 78% approval rating. See “Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit”, 8 June, 2016 www.pewresearch.org/topics/europe
Are NATO and the EU Compatible?
In some ways the EU poses a direct threat to the realisation of the Defence Investment Pledge. On May 25th, 2016 Eurozone finance ministers agreed to offer Greece a further €8bn in loans, and in two hence years offer Athens debt relief (crucially after French presidential and German federal elections in 2017). This is a big step down the road towards debt mutualisation. Given that 18 EU member-states are carrying public debt far beyond the 3% budget deficit to GDP ratio enshrined in EU law the result will not only likely be more austerity for the debtor members, but more large transfers of taxpayer's money from the ten EU member-states that actually pay for the Union. When political push comes to strategic shove, and when faced with a choice between complying with an EU 'law' and meeting a NATO 'guideline', it is almost certain that the EU will win out whatever the strategic environment in which Europeans find themselves, short that is of war. The Euro-federalists will also use the tension created between the two obligations to insist that a 'common' defence is the only way to meet the 'obligations' of membership of both NATO and the core EU.

This stand-off might happen far more quickly than many in Europe hope or imagine if the next US administration demands that NATO Allies move towards the 2%/20% goals far more quickly than the 'within a decade' specified in the Wales Summit Declaration. In which case many states that are both NATO and EU members will likely find themselves trapped in a kind of political no-man's land between German-demanded austerity, EU debt to GDP laws, and American-driven demands for all NATO members to spend 2% GDP on defence.

Furthermore, such a no-man's land could endure for some time because for all the political ambitions implicit in CSDP there is not going to be a European super-state, Germany is not going to be Europe's leading military power, and any new political settlement in the form of a new EU treaty is unlikely to be agreed until 2023 at the earliest. The cruncher is this; whatever the political settlement reached in the EU, and whatever successive sum-
mits demand of NATO, relative American global weakness allied to a structural national debt that will top $20 trillion by 2020, will force Europeans to work together more closely for their own defence. Paradoxically, such collaboration will be vital if an American-centric NATO is to remain central to the defence of Europe, but greatly constrained by what are likely to be continued contentions over the locus and organisation of power in Europe. Moreover, given the balance of defence investments there could be no EU security and defence policy worthy of the name without Britain.

Has NATO the Strategic Imagination to Fight a New War?
Hybrid warfare is the use of exploitation and intimidation by relatively weaker illiberal powers and actors to exploit the very openness and thus the vulnerabilities inherent in and to intrinsically stronger liberal democracies. To close those gaps without closing society the Warsaw Summit must reinforce the search for innovation, not least in NATO and national defence planning. The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept defines hybrid warfare as "...threats posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives".29 Some have taken this to mean that hybrid warfare is half war or even no war, when in fact it is a new way of war. To fight such a war NATO will need to develop an entirely new concept of escalation. Is NATO up to the challenge?

Time is pressing; unless Europeans secure their home base from asymmetric attack, particularly on the critical infrastructures and utilities upon which all European societies depend, then the danger exists that weak European leaders will be unwilling to commit to forward deterrence and collective defence, let alone projection of power through the use of advanced deployable conventional armed forces. If that should happen then NATO will in effect be neutralised.

The aim of such attacks is to keep European states and peoples permanently on the defensive politically, militarily, even psychologically, by ensuring

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23 See "NATO Strategic Concept", www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html
Europe is also permanently off-balance, unsure of itself, and of any course of action. There are two ways to achieve the balance between resilience and influence vital to defeating the new way of warfare. Resilience in the sense that in addition to the hardening of systems societies will need to be far better educated about the threats they face and individuals far more deeply imbued with a new sense of security responsibility. Influence in the sense that western societies will need to far more systematically exploit comparative advantages in areas such as technology.

The latter is primarily the aim of the so-called Third Offset Strategy the US is working up under Assistant Secretary of Defense Bob Work. A hybrid defence is a concept of defence by which security and defence actually merge. If successful such a strategy would enable all the Allies to be secure at a far lower level of risk from attack, which in turn might make Europeans far more willing to engage threat beyond Europe’s borders.

However, European leaders need first to understand the level of adversary ambition implicit in contemporary ideas of hybrid warfare. Such warfare is not just the chosen weapon of the illiberal state and/or actor against the liberal state short of war. It could well be a prelude to war, and if needs be a method for fighting a war. As such hybrid warfare operates at three systemic levels; at the grand strategic level, at the societal level through the use of armed militias to attack Western societies from within, and at the level of the individual through lone wolf attacks with strategic consequences far beyond the damage the act itself creates.

Countering hybrid warfare would thus require strategy that would in turn need to look like a total security concept. As such it would have a profound impact on NATO’s planning drivers, not least the relationship between Articles 4 and 5 of the Washington Treaty. If disinformation, destabilisation and disruption are the stuff of most contemporary crises, such a strategy could quickly be escalated towards high-end conventional and even nuclear war. Therefore, the establishment of early indicators of pending conflict would be vital, as well as an enhanced degree of devolved authority to NATO’s military authorities from the NAC so that NATO forces can prevent/respond rapidly in the event of a crisis-cum-pre-war.

Even collective defence would need to be re-conceived. First, a credible defence would need to incorporate elements of forward deterrence, forward defence, and what Professor Dan Hamilton calls forward resilience.30 Faced with the new way of warfare rapid reinforcement for frontier states would simply not be sufficient and SACEUR is right to be re-considering NATO’s force posture in light of contemporary threats. After all, given that hybrid warfare seeks to exploit the West’s multifarious seams the greatest seams beyond those in Western societies, and those that exist between allied states and the fears in our own heads, is the political seam between collective security and collective defence.

Collective defence would also need to reconceive the meaning of an attack. Critically, the Alliance would need to consider when disruption is either a prelude to destruction, or sufficiently dangerous as to be deemed destruction in its own right, thus warranting the invocation of Article 5. There is after all a precedent which was set on 12 September, 2001 when Article 5 was invoked by the NAC in the aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington.

However, it is ‘defence’ planning that would need perhaps the greatest rethink if the Alliance is to successfully fight such a war. NATO’s entire defence planning edifice is committed to getting Europeans to build more of the platforms and systems that frankly the founders of the Alliance would recognise. However, are they the right platforms and systems given the nature of the threat? Clearly, many of them are otherwise the likes of China and Russia would not be building them.

What is the mix of nuclear forces, conventional forces, missile defences, cyber offence and defence, information warfare, strategic communica-

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tions, critical infrastructure protection, and intelligence assets Alliance forces would need by, say, 2030 to defend the Euro-Atlantic community? 2030 is, after all, less than one defence planning cycle hence. Are their outlandish technologies such as Artificial Intelligence that could be co-opted to maintain the all-important edge over adversaries? These are all questions emerging from the new way of warfare and which frankly Warsaw should consider, but which due to locked-in budgets, locked-in programmes, and a lack of strategic imagination, Warsaw will almost certainly not!

If Alliance members and their forces and resources are to be properly applied industry will also need to be brought early into the requirement-procurement cycle. However, such a relationship would demand of governments a new culture in their relationship with defence industries, and an acknowledgement that in a complex environment neither governments nor the armed forces that serve them tend to be very clear about ‘future requirement’.

Such an assessment would also demand both a holistic concept of security policy and a commitment to consider the worst-case, leading in turn to defence policy that properly embeds new thinking about the ends, ways, and means needed to generate twenty-first century security and defence. Such a concept implies a host of critical questions. What would be the critical civilian capabilities and capacities needed, what would be the critical military capabilities and capacities, what would be the established relationship between such capabilities and capacities, those of other states, and how best to organise them effectively and efficiently?

Europe's armed forces would also need to be able to operate to effect across the eight domains of influence and effect; air, sea, land, cyber, space, information, resilience, and knowledge. All eight domains are addressed in widely and wildly different and differing ways by Allied forces and, yet all are critical to future interoperability, which in turn is vital to credible forward deterrence and defence in the face of the new warfare.

Therefore, if none of the above are addressed by leaders at Warsaw, or leaders do not permit NATO to think transformatively in the form of Allied Command Transformation because all of the above are politically 'too difficult', then NATO will continue its steady march not just to the margins of American grand strategy, but a credible European defence. The words 'Potemkin' and 'Village' already come to mind too often these days when describing NATO.

**Do NATO Leaders have the Political Courage to even think about War?**

Fighting the new warfare will above all require political courage, a determination to break out of the input culture that is killing Alliance defence planning, a new focus on outcomes as the measure of progress, and a recognition of Europe’s many deep vulnerabilities. That challenge will in turn require a political level of ambition commensurate with the growing range of threats Europe faces; the measure which in reality (forget the political spin) history will come eventually to judge the success or failure of the Warsaw Summit.

The political, defence and operational challenge posed by hybrid warfare to NATO concerns essentially who decides what, where and when to enable the Alliance to exert and exact a credible defence. Indeed, without a tight pol-mil relationship and a rapid decision-making loop Allied engagement of hybrid threats will remain behind the speed of erosion of such systems and structures an adversary could initiate. Therefore, a fundamental issue Warsaw must address is the scope and extent of devolved political command authority in the early phase of a hybrid war to ensure that military high readiness is matched by political agility if deterrence is not to be critically undermined.

If NATO defence planning is to successfully adapt and adjust to the new way of warfare intelligence, strategy, capability, redundancy, and resiliency will be vital so that such threats can be defined and properly understood before they are engaged, and defeated. If early indicators are to then translate into tailored action, agile and effective conventional forces will remain the first line of defence and will necessarily underpin Alliance deterrence, high readiness (and high responsive) forces, and a credible and linked nuclear deterrent, the *ultima ratio* guarantor of Alliance security. Such a publicly-declared multi-layered and multi-faceted NATO security and defence architecture would
underpin a demonstrable Allied capacity to escalate and dominate across the new conflict spectrum, and need to be seen so to do.

However, in the event deterrence fails NATO forces must have the capacity, capability, and mission command agility to fight a real war. That in turn entails the strengthening of societal cohesion within NATO nations, through the forging of close links between the civilian and military aspects of security and defence. Without a reasonably secure home base it is hard to see how the Alliance could prevail in such a war, particularly if it was the agent of choice of an adversary illiberal power, actor, or grouping of such powers.

Therefore, in defence planning terms if Warsaw is indeed to build on Wales then one focus of the Summit must be on effective force generation and efficient command and control of the complex coalitions that would be needed to fight such a war. That aim in turn would mean a future NATO force built on good and shared intelligence, significant numbers of mobile relatively heavy forces, robust command and control, the ability to respond rapidly, allied to the capacity to surge to mass via a big, agile reserve, and a range of well-embedded, and well-worked-up strategic partnerships.

What Price Will the Americans Demand?
This question of course critical for Warsaw and the future of NATO. With a change in US policy and stance likely after the November presidential elections the Warsaw Summit will also need to consider a set of larger issues relating to burden-sharing and the maintenance of interoperability of European forces with their American counterparts. All of these challenges will impact on NATO defence planning because such questions impact directly on the place of NATO in a changing US grand strategy, and in particular what impact such changes would likely have on European force levels, structure and posture.

As discussed above, the Americans are considering a whole host of future force technologies to future proof their future force. What impact will new technologies have on Alliance cohesion in the so-called 6G revolution, in areas such as Artificial Intelligence, drone technology, nano-technol- gy, cyber, missile defence etc? Thereafter, what should be the balance of European investments to be made between high-end and low-to-medium-end capabilities and capacities, the impact of such investments (or indeed disinvestments) on NATO interoperability? What defence-industrial strategy worthy of the name is needed to realise both capability and capacity? All of these questions will impact on a new US Administration and Congress bound to demand a fairer sharing of burdens on the terms it sets, rather than nefarious European academic attempts to define said burden-sharing by other means, and pretend weakness is strength.

What will the new Administration demand from the raft of other defence planning-related policies that will be discussed at Warsaw, such as Distinctive Partnerships, and Defence and Related Security Capacity-Building? Moreover, with the situation deteriorating badly in Afghanistan NATO support for enhanced training of Afghan National Security Forces must also be on the Warsaw agenda.

Above all, what choice will America make over the next decade if the NATO Allies refuse to meet American concerns?

What Critical Defence-Planning Issues must Warsaw Address?
Implicit in all of the questions above is the central question the NATO Warsaw Summit needs to address: what and where is to be NATO’s main effort for the foreseeable future? What must be the minimum adaptation/transformation needed for the Alliance to credibly meet the challenges of what will necessarily be a big grand strategic effort. In defence planning terms that challenge can be translated into a further question; what continuum of capabilities and capacities will be needed by the Alliance across the entire spectrum of the new way of warfare?

Drive 360 degree adaptation: Warsaw will need in effect to begin the adaptation of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept to both capture and serve the new reality. Indeed, whilst the words of the Concept still have some limited planning traction their original meaning has been eroded by time and events. Yes, collective defence, crisis management, and co-operative security remain relevant, but all three need to be very much grander in terms of
scope and reach if they are to serve the contemporary and future defence needs of the Alliance.

**Balance prevention, adaptation, engagement and resilience:** If Warsaw is to build on Wales it must focus on prevention, adaptation, and engagement with all three built on enhanced resilience. Resilience in turn will demand effective (rather than effusive) strategic communications (Stratcom) for both home audiences and as part of key partner and adversary leader engagement. Such a strategic realignment of the Alliance will in effect reflect a mid-term plus policy review of the Strategic Concept for accuracy, credibility and contemporary relevance given the challenges posed by hybrid warfare.

**Balance conflict prevention and deterrence:** Prevention of conflict requires the entire deterrence posture of the Alliance to be thoroughly reviewed as today it is at best ‘tired’, and at worst close to failure. Such a review would in turn require a far better understanding of the new way of warfare. Critically, NATO must establish a proper distinction between and granulated understanding of the threats posed to the Alliance by Russia from 'Strategic Direction East', and by ISIS from 'Strategic Direction South'. To that end the December 2015 Hybrid Warfare Strategy needs to focus on the generation of security and defence planning traction with forces and resources better aligned.

**Commit to hard adaptation:** Adaptation of the Alliance will also need a far wider concept of change than enhanced defence planning. However, it is what might best be termed 'hard adaptation' where Warsaw needs to lead. NATO's nuclear deterrence posture, readiness and messaging also needs to be re-considered in response to Moscow's heightened use of nuclear weapons as an intrinsic part of their concept of hybrid warfare. In particular, Warsaw must reaffirm that NATO is a nuclear alliance that understands the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence, and that no adversary however well-armed will ever gain escalation dominance though nuclear blackmail. To that end, a heightened role for the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) would demonstrate that that NATO has lost neither the knowledge, nor the understanding of, the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence.

**Re-establish a demonstrable link between conventional and nuclear deterrence:** If the deterrence value of Alliance nuclear forces is to be fully realised NATO's conventional military preparedness and readiness must also be credible. Specifically, there will also need to be a full exercise and training programme to drive the force transition from the conventional to the nuclear. Certainly, NATO will need to respond to Russia’s stated military doctrine that seeks to use nuclear weapons to (apparently) "de-escalate crises" in Moscow’s favour.

**Drive real transformation:** Warsaw should finally release Allied Command Transformation (ACT) from the political shackles imposed on it by the NAC, and provide the necessary funding (which is not the case at present), to properly develop exercise and training programmes to reflect recent developments in and reactions to hybrid warfare. Specifically, NATO needs to make far better use of lessons identified and lessons-learned from recent campaigns and incorporate them via a 'scientific' development programme into the development of a future force (and forces) which itself must be reinforced by a series of linked exercises and defence education initiatives designed to test the unknown rather than confirm the already known. The two joint force commands and the graduated readiness force headquarters would have a key role to play in the development of such a programme with a particular focus on mission command success at every level of command up to, and possibly beyond, two-star level.

**Build equal partnerships:** NATO also needs to consider more fully the vital role Partners have to play in the NATO hybrid warfare strategy. Such an approach would necessarily re-consider partnership mechanisms in light of hybrid warfare, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Co-operation Initiative, Partners across the Globe and Partnership for Peace. No longer is it sufficient for the Alliance to support Partner states through defence diplomacy, training etc. Middle Eastern and North African countries in particular have specific knowledge advantages and will be equal partners in the struggle against ISIS.

**Make hybrid strategy strategic:** As suggested at the outset of this paper NATO must not be forced to trade space for time in the event of a full-scale
war of which hybrid warfare is but a prelude. Therefore, the Alliance must also consider an offensive hybrid strategy, and how best to force an adversary and its forces off-balance, both politically and militarily. NATO forces must be aim to force an adversary onto the defensive via a strategy that imposes the unexpected on adversary decision-makers. Critical to the new Strategy will be early indicators to enable a more agile response to hybrid threats, especially in the early phase of the conflict cycle. These indicators will also require a new relationship between closed and open source information and better exploitation of the Alliance of knowledge communities. NATO also needs an effective strategic communications strategy as a vital part of Alliance defence against the new warfare. Effective messaging will be central to strategic communications. Particular emphasis will be needed on NATO-EU synergy in this domain and tight joint messaging thereafter.

Enshrine forward resilience: The concept of forward resilience implies the need for Warsaw to properly consider how best to enhance the resiliency of Allies and Partners. A particular focus is needed on the protection of critical national information structures, infrastructures, and effective consequence management. A useful first-step could be an analysis of vulnerabilities to better understand how individual NATO nations could be undermined by hybrid warfare. Possibly in conjunction with the EU such an analysis would necessarily include an understanding of how, and to what extent if, any minorities are susceptible to manipulation; the vulnerability of the media space to external saturation; how the lack of a binding national narrative could be exploited; and how electorates could be alienated from leadership during a hybrid warfare-inspired crisis, particularly through elite corruption.

Commit to a real NATO engagement strategy: Warsaw also needs to drive forward a new engagement strategy. The new way of warfare seeks to exploit the seams between collective defence, crisis management and co-operative security. Twenty-first century Alliance collective defence will also require a mix of coalitions and Alliance-wide action. The capacity for the rapid force generation of coalitions of allies and partners, supported by effective command and control at short notice, will be central to NATO’s military responsiveness and agility.

Create a deep joint force: In support of forward deterrence combined and ‘deep joint’ Alliance forces must be able to operate effectively in and across the eight domains of strategic hybrid warfare – air, sea, land, space, cyber, information, resilience, and knowledge. Critically, the military relationship between NATO’s first responder forces and heavier, follow-on forces, many of which may be deployed outside of Europe, will need to be worked up.

Implement Wales in full: Finally, Warsaw must maintain impetus towards the full implementation of what was agreed at the Wales Summit. The September 2014 NATO Wales Summit was a benchmark summit; much like London in 1991 and Washington in 1999, and must thus be implemented in full. Therefore, NATO political guidance must establish credible capability requirements for twenty-first collective defence that generates a new kind of ‘defence’ through a mix of advanced deployable forces, cyber-defence and missile defence. Again, strategic hybrid warfare is not simply an alternative form of warfare; it is the new way of warfare.

Is NATO the Enduring Alliance?
The NATO Warsaw Summit is ultimately going to be seen as THE defence and deterrence summit. NATO’s territory is far harder to defend in 2016 than it was in 1989. Rising to meet that challenge will be the true test of the Warsaw Summit and the heads of state and government who will grace it. Therefore, if Warsaw is indeed to meet that challenge it must end the strategic ambiguity of which the Wales Declaration reeked. Wales still reflected a misplaced hope that Russia could be persuaded to retreat from confrontation, and that ISIS would somehow collapse. Indeed, in Newport the very use of the word ‘reassurance’, as opposed to ‘deterrence’, was proof of strategic ambiguity. Confrontation with NATO and the EU is now central to the very narrative the Kremlin is using to justify an onerous investment in security structures (including defence) that at times tops 10% of Russia’s failing GDP.

President Putin will do whatever it takes to remain in power as he has come to see himself as the only
true guardian of Russia, Russians, and the Russian state and his very jaundiced zero sum view of the West. Therefore, at the very least the Warsaw Summit must pave the way for an acceleration in the increases in defence expenditure agreed at Wales, properly establish counter-hybrid strategies, including cyber defence, and unequivocally restore the link between NATO’s nuclear and conventional deterrence and defence postures. Critically, the Spearhead Force/VJTF and the enhanced NATO Response Force must be reinforced by the creation of a much heavier force that would look something like the old Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, but far heavier and more mobile.

Such a force and the hard-wired deterrence infrastructure in which it would be embedded, would raise significantly the cost for President Putin of any adventurism, demonstrate NATO Europe’s willingness to share US burdens, ease pressure on an over-stretched American military, and create a fire brigade, first responder force that could credibly look east and south with power rather than pretence. Having taken these steps the allies must then talk to Russia as peace can only be guaranteed through strength.

Above all, Warsaw must confirm a Baltics Strategy. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are by no means perfect states. However, these three recently re-freed peoples are the very embodiment of what the liberal West and both NATO and the EU stand for – the sovereign right of peoples to make their own sovereign choices as expressed through freely-elected representatives. Such freedoms cannot be defended by words alone, and aggressors cannot be deterred by good intentions alone, however well-intentioned.

The partial success of Wales was to turn accepted practice into policy. Warsaw must build on that. NATO today is a coalition generator and commander for offensive security operations by assorted members and partners alike, and remains the absolute defence guarantee for its members. Nothing more, nothing less. The Readiness Action Plan, in many ways the centrepiece of the Wales Summit, implied far more than a relatively modest adaptation of NATO forces and resources. It implied a merger of collective defence, crisis management and co-operative security into a coherent security and defence concept in the face of a new way of war. At the very least the de facto addition of cyber-defence to collective defence was a step down the road to the much needed overhaul and modernization of Alliance collective defence.

However, it is where ambition and investment meet that Warsaw’s rubber will really hit the NATO road. If Warsaw invents more acronyms to be spread across NATO forces that are in fact continuing to shrink then very quickly it will be deemed to have failed. Indeed, with the VJTF and the eNRF leading and ‘complementing’ the nine graduated readiness forces that sit at the core of the NATO Force Structure it is reasonable to ask just how many new forces the Alliance can create from ever-shrinking militaries. ‘Graduated’ must mean a real ability to escalate force, not another metaphor for forces incapable of application or action. Real force costs money and on the critical issue of defence spending Wales demonstrated the extent to which the Eurozone crisis has and is undermining NATO. Can Warsaw suggest otherwise with the Greek debt crisis about to again come to the fore and some form of debt mutualisation now established in principle by the Eurozone states?

NATO is vulnerable and Warsaw must end that vulnerability. Perhaps the worst ambiguity in an ambiguous Wales was the language in the Declaration itself, “the aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade with a view to meeting their [nations] NATO Capability Targets and filling NATO’s Capability shortfalls”. Why within a decade? Read on in the Declaration and the reason becomes clear – when economic growth returns. With defence investment at an historic low in Europe what systemic shock will it take before security takes priority over austerity?

The logic of Wales was that in reality many NATO members had no intention of spending more on defence and that such states will continue to either recognise only as much threat as they can afford, or expect others to do their defending for them. If such pass the buck denial continues at Warsaw NATO will not endure, nor by the way will any putative EU defence.
Maybe Warsaw needs to grip another reality. The Wales Summit also pointed towards a multi-speed NATO that will rarely if ever operate at twenty-nine, with profound implications for Alliance cohesion, military interoperability, burden-sharing, and of course defence planning. The fact that the US-led coalition against ISIS includes to the fore states such as Australia, willing to do far more than existing NATO members, suggests a future in which formal alliances might not survive at all. Rather, a failed NATO would see the emergence of ad hoc coalitions of states that can and will.

The states involved in the coalition is in and of itself interesting - America, Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Turkey - NATO's big and bigger-thinking powers. That suggests a NATO core group with whom the Americans will do business, cheerleaders who will back such efforts verbally but do little more, and feet-shufflers who demand a say but would rather not be bothered to act. Interestingly, the involvement of Australia in the coalition also suggests how the US sees the future NATO as one element in a world-wide West; a global security web of democracies focused on the United States, but divided into the protectors and the protected.

History may indeed not repeat itself, but patterns of power do. There is perhaps one lesson of history worth recalling, not least because of the very location of the Warsaw Summit. On reading the text of the Wales Summit Declaration I could not help but be reminded of my Oxford thesis on British Policy and the Coming of War 1933-1941. Back then I had the very real privilege of reading all the British Cabinet minutes covering that vital nine year period. Much has been made of how the Ramsay MacDonald, Baldwin and Chamberlain cabinets were deeply split over what to do about the rise of Hitler. In fact in October 1933 the Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff scrapped the so-called Ten Year Rule by which Britain could assume that it need not plan for another major war in Europe.

In February 1934 London committed itself to huge rearmament programmes. Part of this decision was due to the need to reflate the British economy in the midst of the Great Depression. However, the record is equally clear that part of the decision was an early recognition that war might just return to Europe. The decision led in time to the invention of radar, the Spitfire, the Hurricane, Bomber Command and the new Royal Navy, which fought and eventually helped defeat the Nazis, and to the vital future proofing of British industry. In that light perhaps the most important achievement of the Warsaw Summit will be to end the implicit Ten Year Rule which confirms strategic pretence and under which European leaders labour, and which is preventing the Alliance from taking the necessary steps to properly re-establish a credible deterrence and defence posture. Too many European leaders are appeasing reality and it is the ending of such appeasement which is perhaps the true test of Warsaw. Are we up to it?

Writing in the the fourth century AD Vegetius said in De Re Militari, “Si vis pacem, para bellum” (If you want peace, prepare for war?). War is of course unthinkable, but in the Europe of today it is not entirely unimaginable. It is ultimately the danger of war that Warsaw must address for only by addressing the danger of war will NATO, can NATO, possibly endure. The defence against war is what, after all, NATO is for.

There is one final question this paper must address and it concerns strategic denial on the part of Europe's leaders that is perhaps the greatest threat to NATO today and Warsaw will ultimately stand or fall on the willingness and desire of such leaders to confront such denial. The refusal to confront the worst-case reinforces too often the sense that too many NATO leaders are playing at deterrence. Sadly, that sense is reinforced by the patent gap between the rhetoric in the September 2014 Wales Summit Declaration about the need for increased defence spending (eventually) and increased investment in defence equipment (occasionally), and today's stark reality. Warsaw must at least finally end the retreat from defence reality if deterrence is to be restored to its place at the centre of NATO's hard military core.

The bottom-line for the Warsaw Summit is this; effective NATO deterrence will only be established if NATO's forward presence is in strength, reinforced by a properly enhanced NATO Response Force, which in turn is allied to a credible ability of
Alliance forces to overcome Russia’s growing and impressive anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capability. And, that NATO forces are able to deploy in sufficient force and time to match Russian deployments. At present that is not the case. Indeed, it is still far from being the case.

Therefore, political momentum must be the stuff of the Warsaw Summit. If Warsaw can maintain such momentum then the Summit will be deemed a success. If it says a lot, but does very little, then the Summit will fail. There was once a time when such failure could be finessed away. Not anymore! Will NATO endure?
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